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 Introduction and Background 
 
The causes and consequences of democracy have long 
been at the forefront of scholarly research and 
policymaking in an effort to understand and develop the 
conditions that are supportive of democracy, as well as 
work towards demonstrating the tangible benefits that 
come from establishing democracy around the world. 
One body of work using increasingly complex and 
statistically sophisticated cross-national research has 
sought to test competing theories and propositions 
concerning both the establishment and maintenance of 
democratic rule. Another body of work examines the 
tangible benefits of democracy at the domestic and 
international level, including better and more equitable 
economic development, as a basis for long-term intra-
state and inter-state peace, the promotion and protection 
of human rights, and a greater guarantee for human 
security. Across these different areas of work, it appears 
that democracy features as both an end in itself, as well 
as a means to achieving other related outcomes that 
benefit humanity. 
 
Democratization studies and comparative 
democratization programmes have developed throughout 
the academic world, most notably in Europe and the 
United States, while attention within the international 
donor community has gradually shifted from a narrow 
focus on sound financial management to notions of good 
governance that include the rule of law and protection of 
human rights, and in certain cases, democracy. For 
example, on 1 May 2007, Hilary Benn, the UK Secretary 
of State for International Development publicly 
announced DFID’s commitment to democracy as a 
preferable institutional arrangement for countries to tackle 
poverty reduction and to ‘share out the benefits of 
development’. In addition, the foreign policies of powerful 
states in the world have included support for civil society 
groups and nascent political party organisations in 
transitional countries; state building, institutionalization, 
and the specification of criteria for appropriate and 
acceptable forms of democratic rule. Analysis and policy 
making in the area of democracy of the kind outlined here 
are predicated on definitions of democracy, measures 
and assessments of democracy, as well as the 
identification of significant empirical relationships and 
entry points to help build democratic institutions and 
develop a long term democratic culture within transitional 
societies. This briefing paper contributes to this agenda in 
several ways. First, it outlines different definitions of 
democracy that have informed policy makers and 
analysts, including procedural democracy, liberal 
democracy, and social democracy. Second, it reviews 
and assesses the main ways in which democracy has 
been measured including ‘all or nothing’ categories,  
ordinal scales and international rankings coded by 
experts, objective measures using key indicators related 
to elections and party systems, and hybrid measures that 
combine objective indicators with expert judgements. 
Third, the paper examines the different ways in which aid 
conditionality policies have increasingly taken on board 
questions of democracy, good governance, and human 
This briefing paper reviews the existing research and debates on the causes and consequences of 
democracy to provide guidance on the key conceptual and methodological issues surrounding 
democracy promotion and aid conditionality. It provides three working definitions of democracy; a 
review of the different strategies and efforts to measure democracy; an examination of the empirical 
findings on the causes and consequences of democracy; and concludes with a discussion of the 
dimensions of aid conditionality by examining the efforts by the USAID, the World Bank, and UK 
Department for International Development (DfID) in linking measures and assessments of governance 
to the allocation of aid. 
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rights in the formulation of long-term partnerships with 
recipient countries, including the US government’s 
Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), the World Bank’s 
Country Policy Institutional Assessment (CPIA), and 
DFID’s country governance assessment (CGA). 
 




Democracy is a classic example of an ‘essentially 
contested’ concept (Gallie 1956), since there is not now, 
nor will there likely be, a final consensus on its definition 
or full content. Nevertheless, there are certain features of 
democracy about which there is significant consensus 
and the world has countless examples of democratic 
practices that have existed over long periods of time and 
have now advanced across vast geographical spaces. 
The idea that democracy is a form of governance based 
on some degree of popular sovereignty and collective 
decision-making remains largely uncontested. But it is the 
concern over the additional features to this basic 
formulation that have produced significant and serious 
debate about the different definitions of democracy. For 
the purposes of this paper, these definitions of 
democracy include procedural democracy, liberal 
democracy, and social democracy, which are now 
considered in turn. 
 
Procedural definitions of democracy, made most notably 
in Robert Dahl’s (1971) seminal work Polyarchy, include 
the two dimensions of contestation and participation. 
Contestation captures the uncertain peaceful competition 
necessary for democratic rule, a principle which 
presumes the legitimacy of some opposition, the right to 
challenge incumbents, protection of the twin freedoms of 
expression and association, the existence of free and fair 
elections, and a consolidated political party system. 
Participation captures the idea of popular sovereignty, 
which presumes the protection of the right to vote as well 
as the existence of universal suffrage. Liberal definitions 
of democracy maintain concerns over contestation and 
participation, but add more explicit references to the 
protection of certain human rights. Liberal definitions 
include an institutional dimension that captures the idea 
of popular sovereignty, and includes notions of 
accountability, constraint of leaders, representation of 
citizens, and universal participation. But it adds a rights 
dimension, which is upheld through the rule of law, and 
includes civil, political, property, and minority rights. 
Social definitions of democracy maintain the institutional 
and rights dimensions found in liberal definitions of 
democracy but expand the types of rights that ought to be 
protected, including social and economic rights. 
 
Taken together, these three definitions of democracy 
share certain features such as the notion of peaceful 
competitive politics and some form of participation, but 
then add further features meant to protect individuals and 
groups across increasingly wider aspects of their lives. 
Procedural definitions of democracy identify the minimum 
requirements for upholding participatory competitive 
politics. Liberal definitions include the full protection of 
civil, political, property, and minority rights, which are 
meant to curb the possible negative consequences of 
democratic governance based on majority rule only. 
Social definitions include additional protections for 
economic and social rights, which are seen as essential 
for the full participation of citizens in the collective 
decisions that may affect their lives. There are thus ‘thin’ 
and ‘thick definitions of democracy, the differences in 
which are inexorably linked with the degree to which 
scholars have been able to measure and analyse the 
patterns in the emergence, maintenance, and 
performance of democracy. 
Measuring Democracy 
 
Social science measurement establishes a direct link 
between background concepts and indicators by 
providing a systematised version of the background 
concept, operationalising the systematised concept, and 
providing meaningful ‘scores’ that vary across units of 
analysis (Adcock and Collier 2001). With respect to the 
measurement of democracy, the numerous measurement 
efforts in political science tend to specify democracy in its 
minimal and procedural form or provide indicators for the 
institutional and rights dimensions that comprise liberal 
definitions. Fully specified measurements of social 
democracy have thus far remained elusive, which can be 
explained in part by the political culture and ideology of 
(American) political science itself, which privileges 
narrower definitions of democracy, and explained in part 
by the serious methodological challenges that have yet to 
be overcome in providing valid, meaningful, and 
comparable measures of economic and social rights 
(Landman 2004, 2005a, 2005b, 2006).  
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Social scientists have adopted a number of strategies to 
measure democracy for empirical analysis, including 
categorical measures, ordinal scale measures, objective 
measures, hybrid measures of democratic practices, and 
perceptions of democracy based on mass public opinion 
surveys. This quest for comparability and broad temporal 
and spatial coverage, however, has meant a certain 
sacrifice in the ability for these measures to capture the 
context-specific features of democracy. In response, the 
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance (IDEA) has developed an alternative 
framework for democracy assessment that moves away 
from country ranking and external judgment to 
comprehensive assessment based on national 
assessment teams led by governments or civil society 
and academic institutions. There is scope in the 
framework for using extant measures while at the same 
time incorporating much more context-specific 
information on the quality of democracy that can then be 
linked to domestic processes of democratic reform. 
These measurement and assessment strategies are 
considered in turn. 
 
Democracy as an ‘All or Nothing’ Affair 
 
Seymour Martin Lipset (1959) established the first set of 
categorical measures of regime type that were used for 
cross-national quantitative analysis, which ranged across 
a ‘democracy-dictatorship’ continuum including stable 
democracies, unstable democracies, unstable 
dictatorships, and stable dictatorships. More recently, 
Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi (2000) 
developed a dichotomous classification scheme using a 
set of criteria for judging whether countries are 
democratic or authoritarian. To qualify as a democracy 
under their set of criteria, a country must have had its 
chief executive elected, its main legislative body elected, 
and it must have more than one political party. These 
criteria are quite narrow and specifically exclude 
questions of accountability, freedom, participation and 
rights, among others. The categorisation also rests on the 
assumption that democracy is an ‘all or nothing’ affair, 
which is coded as 0 or 1, and tries to avoid over-counting 
the number of democracies in the world. Despite these 
assumptions and narrow focus, this method has provided 
democracy measures with a wide spatial and temporal 
coverage for use in global quantitative comparative 
analysis. Typically, the resulting data sets include over 
150 countries for between 40 (Przeworski, Alvarez, 
Cheibub, and Limongi 2000) and 100 years (Boix 2003). 
Indeed, for those studies reaching back into the 19th 
Century, democracy is specified in even more minimal 
fashion to include free and fair elections, accountable 
executives, and at least fifty percent enfranchisement for 




Ordinal scale measures of democracy also specify a set 
of criteria for judging countries, but unlike the categorical 
measures, they assume democracy to be more 
continuous and provide scales that range from low to high 
values. For example, the Polity data series takes into 
account both the democratic and autocratic features of 
countries, while its combined score on democracy ranges 
from –10 for a full autocracy to +10 for full democracy 
(see Jaggers and Gurr 1995). Freedom House has two 
separate scales for political and civil liberties that range 
from 1 (full enjoyment of liberties) to 7 (full restriction of 
liberties), which have often featured in cross-national 
comparisons in some combined form as a measure of 
democracy (see www.freedomhouse.org, and Burkhart 
and Lewis-Beck 1994; Helliwell 1994). These scales 
provide greater variation in the level of democracy (as 
opposed to an ‘either-or’ classification) and have wide   
ranging spatial and temporal coverage (e.g. between 194 
and 200 countries and territories for over 30 to 200 
years). While these measures provide greater variation in 
democracy, criticisms have focussed on their less than 
transparent coding rules (especially Freedom House), 
their illogical form of aggregation into single indices that 
does not take into account tradeoffs between the 
institutional and rights dimensions, their inability to 
differentiate the democratic performance of those 
countries at the extreme ends of the spectrum (i.e. 
among mature democracies and highly authoritarian 
regimes), and the possible presence of ideological biases 
(Freedom House in particular) (see Munck and Verkuilen 
2002). 
Objective Measures of Democracy 
 
Objective measures of democracy move away from a 
fixed set of criteria and judgements about county 
locations either into categories or on particular scales and 
concentrate instead on available indicators of democratic 
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practices. Tatu Vanhanen (1997) specifies democracy in 
minimal and procedural fashion along the lines of Robert 
Dahl and then provides separate measures of 
contestation and participation. He uses the percentage 
share of smallest parties in the national legislature (100 
minus the share of the largest party) as a measure of 
contestation and he uses the percentage turnout in 
national elections as a measure of participation. These 
two measures are then multiplied together and divided by 
100 to produce an ‘index of democratisation’. While this 
measure moves away from subjective and judgemental 
categories or scales, quite a few problems remain. First, 
the measure of contestation does not take into account 
the electoral system, which has a direct relationship with 
the effective number of parties in the legislature (see 
Lijphart 1994a, 1999). Countries with single-member 
district electoral systems tend to have a smaller number 
of parties than countries with proportional representation, 
which may lead to the false representation of 
contestation. Second, many countries have compulsory 
voting laws, which necessarily compromises the validity 
of turnout as a measure of voluntary participation. 
Nevertheless, the measure has been used alongside 
other measures of democracy for quantitative analysis 
(see Landman 1999). 
 
Hybrid Measures of Democracy 
 
Another strategy is to use objective indicators alongside 
subjective ones to create a hybrid measure of 
democracy. Staffan Lindberg (2006: 21-51) adopts this 
strategy and focuses exclusively on three dimensions of 
elections: participation, competition, and legitimacy. His 
objective indicators include voter turnout, the winning 
candidate’s percentage of votes, the largest party’s 
percentage of seats, and the 2nd party’s percentage of 
seats. His subjective and categorical indicators include a 
measure for the freeness and fairness of the election, the 
opportunity for the opposition to participate, whether an 
incumbent autocrat has been removed from office, 
whether than has been a turnover of power, whether the 
losers have accepted the outcome, whether the election 
was peaceful, and whether the newly elected regime 
survives. Unlike other efforts which aggregate these 
separate indicators into an overall index of democracy, 
Lindberg (2006) keeps them separate. But like Freedom 
House, his subjective indicators may have some bias as 
no inter-coder reliability tests have been carried out. 
 
Perceptions of Democracy and Trust in 
Institutions 
 
Finally, in addition to these measures of democracy, 
another measurement strategy avoids making external 
judgements against pre-established criteria or using the 
kind of objective measures outlined above and relies 
instead on public perceptions of democracy through the 
collection of individual level survey data. Such data 
provide an indication of the degree to which mass publics 
support democracy in general, as well as provide 
indicators on mass perceptions of the relative performance 
of democracy and faith in democratic institutions. The 
various ‘barometer’ studies began in Europe, and have 
subsequently been extended to Latin America, Africa, and 
are now part of the larger World Barometer Surveys. In 
contrast to the other extant approaches to democracy 
measurement, these data provide an indication of citizen 
support for democracy, which exhibits significant variation 
between and within regions (e.g. Lagos 1997). Survey 
data have been used throughout the social sciences, but 
the cross-national use of survey data for democracy 
analysis such as these rests on the vulnerable assumption 
that all publics have a similar ‘model’ of democracy in their 
heads when they answer standardised questions. 
 
Taken together, categorical classification, ordinal scales, 
objective indicators, hybrid measures, and survey data 
have all been used to provide measures of democracy, 
and all have sought to establish a direct link with a 
conceptual definition of democracy, which has tended to 
be specified in a narrow fashion to include procedural and 
in some cases liberal democracy. All of the measures 
have aimed to provide comparability across the world and 
over time. In this way, the measures use definitions of 
democracy that ‘travel’ across many observable units that 
vary in time and space. This emphasis on achieving a 
greater scope of coverage and comparability, however, 
has meant that these measures are operationalised at a 
relatively high level of abstraction and are less sensitive to 
the cultural specificities of the different countries that they 
purport to measure. 
 
 6 
Institute for Democracy & Conflict Resolution – Briefing Paper (IDCR-BP-01/11) 
INSTITUTE FOR DEMOCRACY AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION (IDCR) 
Part of the University of Essex Knowledge Gateway 
 




The weaknesses of these various measurement 
strategies led to the creation of a different framework for 
assessing the quality of democracy. In partnership with 
the UK Democratic Audit and the University of Essex, 
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance (IDEA) has developed a framework for 
democracy assessment. Based on the twin principles of 
public control over decision makers and political equality 
of those who exercise that control, the framework 
comprises a series of mediating values, and search 
questions across four main elements. These elements 
include citizenship, law, and rights; representative and 
accountable government; civil society and popular 
participation; and democracy beyond the state. The 
framework has been applied in over twenty countries by 
government-led and citizen-led teams of assessors 
across developed and developing countries. After its 
initial success, it featured prominently in the Fifth and 
Sixth International Conferences for New and Restored 
Democracies (ICNRD-5 and ICNRD-6) hosted by 
Mongolia and Qatar, respectively. The framework has 
proven to be flexible and adaptable to different country 
contexts while at the same time providing a systematic 
method for the collection, organisation, and analysis of 
qualitative and quantitative information across a wide-
ranging set of democratic features. The framework is 
different from other efforts to measure and rank 
democracy in that it uses primarily the citizens of the 
country under assessment to carry out the assessment 
and it links the findings of the assessment to an agenda 
for democratic reform. 
 
Evidence and Analysis 
 
The various forms of measurement have been used in 
large-scale analysis that has thus far examined important 
questions on the emergence, maintenance, and 
consequences of democracy. Since the early work of 
Lipset (1959), who declared the ‘more well to do a nation, 
the more likely it is to sustain democracy’, scholars have 
analysed the economic requisites of democracy. Whether 
democracy is measured in categorical or scalar terms 
and regardless of the time period used, global 
comparative analysis has consistently shown a positive 
and significant relationship between high levels of 
economic development and democracy. Such a 
consistent finding has led either to the weak claim that 
the two are associated with one another or to the strong 
claim that economic development causes democracy. 
Both claims try to identify the endogenous and 
exogenous factors for the emergence of democracy. 
Endogenous explanations argue that changes internal to 
the process of economic development necessarily lead to 
a series of social and political changes that culminate in 
democracy. Such factors have variously included the rise 
of an enlightened middle class (Lipset 1959), the push for 
inclusion by the working classes (Rueschemeyer, 
Stephens, and Stephens 1992), and changes in the 
relative distribution of land, income, and capital 
(Vanhanen 1997; Boix 2003; Boix and Stokes 2003).  
 
Exogenous explanations argue that factors external to 
processes of economic development help establish 
democracy, including changes in the relative power and 
strategic interaction of elites within authoritarian regimes 
(Geddes 1999), the strategic interaction between elites in 
the regime and elites in the opposition (Przeworski 1991; 
Colomer 1991, Colomer and  Pascual 1994), and  social 
mobilization for individual rights of citizenship (Foweraker 
and Landman 1997), as well as important international 
factors such as diffusion, contagion, coercion (Whitehead 
1996), and globalization (Li and Reuveny 2003). 
Economic development is not absent from such 
exogenous explanations. Rather, they argue that once 
democracy has been established in countries with high 
levels of economic development, it tends not to collapse 
(Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi 2000). In this 
way, economic development supports the process of 
democratization but it does not determine it (Landman 
2001: 235-239). 
 
Despite the statistical robustness of these studies, they 
beg the crucial question as to why there is now a large 
selection of poor countries in which democracy has been 
sustained. The identification of such ‘outliers’ should be of 
tremendous interest to the policy makers within the donor 
community. The most robust statistical analysis 
conducted on a global sample of countries claims to have 
settled the question as to the relationship between 
development and democracy (Przeworski, et al 2000). 
The study argues that the statistically significant 
relationship between development and democracy 
accounts for the survival of democracy and not its 
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emergence in its first place. As outlined above, the 
findings support the exogenous theory of 
democratization, but more importantly, the statistical 
results suggest that once democracy is established in a 
country with a per capita GDP of $5,500 (indexed to 
1995), then the probability of democratic collapse drops 
to near zero. This finding holds for those already 
democratic countries that manage to grow their way to 
this same amount. While the generalization suggests that 
any number of factors lead to the establishment of 
democracy and that long term patterns of economic 
development will provide additional support to the survival 
of democracy, they do not necessarily provide practical 
policy advice for countries and the international 
community working in those countries struggling to either 
establish or maintain democracy under conditions in 
which such high levels of per capita GDP are not possible 
to achieve in the foreseeable future. 
 
There are many transitional societies and some ‘old’ 
democracies that have nowhere near this kind of per 
capita GDP. For example, those countries that have less 
than $5,500 per capita GDP in 2005 US dollars in 
descending order that have experienced no democratic 
breakdown during the third and fourth wave include Costa 
Rica, Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, Bulgaria, Jamaica, 
Namibia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Paraguay, 
Bolivia, Nicaragua, India, and Mongolia (see World Bank 
world development indicators). The analysis in 
Przeworski et al (2000) suggests that there is still a high 
probability of democratic breakdown in any one of these 
countries since they have not achieved the threshold of 
per capita GDP; however, such analysis offers no hope 
for policy makers and national leaders who are keen to 
consolidate democratic achievements, construct 
democratic institutions, and build long term cultural 
attachments to the idea of democracy such that it 
becomes ‘the only game in town’ (Linz and Stepan 1996). 
Indeed, for most of these countries, achieving such high 
levels of per capita income is a long way off. 
 
An additional challenge lies in the quality of democracy 
itself. The extant analyses on development and 
democracy have been more concerned in explaining the 
emergence of democracy, and have had less to say 
about the quality or performance of democracy itself. 
Efforts to describe the third and fourth waves of 
democracy using institutional and rights measures have 
shown that while the world has witnessed a dramatic 
growth in the number of democracies, the latest waves 
have largely been comprised of ‘illiberal’ democracies 
(Diamond 1999; Zakaria 2003). Illiberal democracies are 
particularly good at establishing the basic institutional 
mechanisms and protections for holding relatively free 
and fair elections, maintaining a relatively free press, 
guaranteeing freedom of expression, and protecting 
rights to assembly and association for the development of 
political parties, civil society organisations, and trade 
unions, but they are less good at protecting citizens from 
ethnic, religious, and gender discrimination, and arbitrary 
detention, torture, ill treatment, and death in custody. 
There is thus a significant gap between the procedural 
and institutional dimensions of democracy on the one 
hand and the protection of civil and minority rights on the 
other. Human rights advocates add that these illiberal 
democracies are equally bad at guaranteeing the 
protection of economic and social rights and point to 
persistent problems with social exclusion and limited 
forms of access to justice, which mean that although 
citizens are legally equal, they remain socially unequal. 
 
There are a variety of institutional and cultural 
explanations for the presence of such illiberal 
democracies. Institutionally, analyses have shown that 
presidential democracies, and especially those with multi-
party systems, are inherently more unstable, prone to 
breakdown, and susceptible to extra-constitutional 
behaviour of presidents that makes the protection of 
rights precarious (Stepan and Skach 1994; Foweraker 
and Landman 2002). Parliamentary systems and so-
called ‘consensus democracies’ perform better across a 
range of indicators including political stability, economic 
performance, and minority and other rights protections 
(Lijphart 1994b; 1999). Other institutional explanations 
focus on weak and less than independent judiciaries 
(Méndez, O’Donnell, and Pinheiro 1999), corruption, 
reserve domains of military power, and vestiges of past 
authoritarian practices (of either the left or the right) (Linz 
and Stepan 1996), and state capacity itself in providing 
the kinds of protections and guarantees that make 
democracy possible. Cultural explanations for the 
presence of illiberal democracies concentrate on 
patrimonial and neo-patrimonial forms of rule (Bratton 
and van de Walle 1997), and consistent levels of mass 
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popular support for security and the quick prosecution of 
criminals that undermine fundamentally a commitment to 
human rights standards. 
 
On a more optimistic note, scholarly research on the 
consequences of democracy shows that democracies 
have significantly better human development records 
(Ersson and Lane 1996) and are no worse at promoting 
growth than authoritarian regimes (Przeworski, Alvarez, 
Cheibub, and Limongi 2000). Despite the problem of 
illiberal democracy, democracies are better at protecting 
‘personal integrity rights’ (Poe and Tate 1994; Davenport 
2001), where dramatic improvement is in rights protection 
is evident after the first year of a democratic transition 
(Zanger 2000), as well as after successive rounds of 
elections, at least in Africa (Lindberg 2006). Democracies 
(especially new democracies) are also more likely to 
participate in the international human rights regime 
through ratification of human rights treaties. Fourth wave 
democracies tend to ratify more international human 
rights treaties with fewer reservations followed by third 
wave democracies and established democracies. But the 
inverse is true for the actual protection of human rights, 
where mature democracies have better human rights 
records than third and fourth wave democracies, 
respectively (Landman 2005b). 
 
Beyond the propensity for democracies to commit 
themselves to international human rights obligations, they 
also show a much lower propensity to get involved in 
‘international entanglements’. Research on the 
‘democratic peace’ has shown that since the middle of 
the 19th Century, pairs of democracies do not go to war 
with one another (Levy 2002) and beyond outright 
engagement in warfare, research has also shown that 
democracies are simply more pacific than authoritarian 
regimes. For example, using a cross-national and time-
series data set of pairs of states (dyads) from 1885 to 
1992, Russett and Oneal (2001) show that the probability 
of a militarised dispute between two countries is greatly 
reduced if both countries are a democracy, even after 
controlling for classic ‘realist’ factors such as relative 
power, distance, and contiguity. They have also shown 
that the presence of one democracy in the pair reduces 
significantly the propensity to engage in a militarised 
dispute with another country, suggesting that 
democracies are simply less conflict-prone than 
authoritarian states. In addition to democracy lowering 
the probability of inter-state and intra-state conflict, it also 
appears to be the preferred system for ensuring greater 
protection of human security (Large and Sisk 2006). 
 
Taken together, the scholarly research on the 
emergence, maintenance, and consequences of 
democracy has revealed a set of fairly consistent set of 
findings that should be of interest to the larger 
international policy and donor community. Whether one 
believes that economic development causes or supports 
democracy and democratic stability, it is clear that an 
increasing resource base enhances the types of choices 
available to ordinary people as well to governments in 
ways that ought in the long run to curb the propensity for 
conflict and threats to democracy. Support for democratic 
institutions, particularly those mechanisms for vertical and 
horizontal accountability that provide for significant 
oversight and scrutiny of state actors is key agenda item 
to make political practices under the rubric of democracy 
become more in line with the normative expectations 
typical of democratic theory. Finally, the peaceful 
consequences of democratization, whether in terms of 
inter-state conflict, intra-state conflict, or general levels of 
human security suggest that whether one agrees with 
Churchill’s famous edict or not, democracy is the most 




In many ways, the international donor community has 
increasingly recognised the value of encouraging 
democratization, although there are hugely differing views 
on how this is meant to be achieved. The United States 
draws on its contrasting experiences of democracy 
promotion. On the one hand, it helped rebuild Europe 
after the war through the Marshall Plan and attempted to 
support democracy in Latin America through the Alliance 
for Progress and related aid packages. This peaceful 
extension of aid and support has continued in the post-
Cold War period, where US aid is extended to civil 
society and political party organisations in transitional 
societies in an effort to build democracy from the ground 
up in ways that will generate stable democratic 
institutions and regular multi-party competitive electoral 
processes. On the other hand, it has a history of 
interventionism ostensibly on behalf of democracy 
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(especially in Latin America) since the turn of the 
Twentieth Century; a general policy option that has 
received increasing support in the current era from the 
neo-conservatives in the Bush administration who are 
committed to the idea that large-scale social and political 
change can be achieved through concerted effort, even if 
such effort requires armed intervention (see Fukuyama 
2006).  
 
The European approach, especially that which has 
developed in parallel fashion with the evolution of the 
European Union, the process of European integration, 
and the end of the Cold War, is one that saw a great 
need to ‘channel the post-Communist European elites’ 
strong desire to join the EU into a grand project of state 
reconstruction and establish clear limits on domestic 
political behaviour’ (Kopstein 2006: 91). The focus for 
democracy building has not been civil society but the 
state and its many institutions, where political order is in 
many ways preferred over freedom, at least for the initial 
period of transition. The passage and assimilation of 
European law (aquis communautaire), coupled with 
monitoring, evaluation, and progress reports from the EU, 
the OSCE, NATO, and the Council of Europe maintained 
a constant level of vigilance over institution building as a 
means to providing the foundation for long term 
democratic stability in those countries that would 
eventually become members of the European Union. 
 
Since the late 1980s and 1990s, the international donor 
community has pursued an alternative set of policies that 
have increasingly linked the conditions and structures of 
governance to the allocation of international assistance, 
which have now increasingly been adopted by 
governments in Europe and North America. Even though 
international financial institutions such as the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund continue to eschew 
using the word ‘democracy’ for its political connotations, 
both institutions recognised that there was a need to 
focus greater attention on good governance as means to 
ensuring sustainable and equitable processes of 
economic development (see World Bank 1992; Weiss 
2000). Thus, the idea of aid conditionality is based on 
rewarding countries for making progress in the 
establishment, maintenance, and performance of ‘good’ 
political institutions. 
 
Good governance has both an economic and a political 
dimension. The economic dimension has variously 
included public sector management, organisational 
accountability, the rule of law, transparency of decision-
making, and access to information. This idea was taken 
on board by the OECD and EU and integrated into its 
requirements for development assistance. It was later 
expanded by the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) to incorporate a political dimension 
that includes government legitimacy, government 
accountability, government competence, and the 
protection of human rights through the rule of law (see 
Weiss 2000). National governments have also begun to 
adopt this form of policy. The Millennium Challenge 
Account established by President George W. Bush in 
2002 allocates US aid on the basis of good governance, 
health and education criteria, and the existence of sound 
economic policies that foster enterprise and 
entrepreneurship.  In its 2006 White Paper, the UK 
Department for International Development (DfID) sees 
good governance as a key factor in the struggle to 
reduce poverty, where an aid relationship is conditioned 
upon the partner country’s commitment to reducing 
poverty and achieving the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs), respecting human rights and other 
international obligations, strengthening financial 
management and accountability, and reducing the risk of 
funds being misused through weak administration and 
corruption. 
  
These policy developments, whether from the 
international financial institutions or national 
governments all require some form of governance 
assessment on which to base aid allocation decisions. 
Various indices have been used that draw on the 
measures of democracy outlined in this paper, including 
expert judgement scales and surveys of public 
perceptions. For its assessment of ‘governing justly’, the 
Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) uses the Freedom 
House measures of civil liberties and political rights, 
alongside the World Bank’s measures of voice and 
accountability, government effectiveness, rule of law, 
and control of corruption.  The ‘governance factor’ of the 
World Bank’s Country Policy Institutional Assessment 
(CPIA), includes indicators for property rights and rules-
based governance, quality of budgetary and financial 
management, efficiency of revenue mobilisation, quality 
of public administration, and transparency, accountability 
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and corruption. The 2006 DfID White Paper pledges to 
carry out a country governance assessment (CGA) for all 
aid recipient countries, but the method for carrying out 
such assessments is still being developed. 
 
Despite the similarity of these approaches and their need 
for measuring democracy, good governance, and human 
rights, they have different approaches in developing 
policy responses on the basis of the results of such 
assessments. The MCA and CPIA have a more stringent 
approach, which links the allocation of aid to the 
achievement of a minimum threshold ranking. While both 
the US and the World Bank have taken into account 
different weightings for the components of their country 
assessment scores, they nonetheless link the final score 
to the decision to allocate aid. DfID’s approach, while still 
in its development phases, differs significantly from the 
US and World Bank models of aid allocation in that 
country governance assessments and human rights 
assessments are used to identify ways in which different 
aid instruments might be used to address significant 
governance problem areas with a view to addressing the 




Summary and Conclusions 
 
This briefing paper has examined the existing research 
and international policy developments relating to the 
emergence, maintenance, and consequences of 
democracy. This work has necessarily relied on 
contested definitions and measures of democracy. Work 
on the emergence of democracy has privileged the 
economic requisites of democracy understood strongly as 
the causes of democracy, or weakly as supportive of 
democracy. This work has also used two competing 
understandings of democracy, where one sees it as an 
‘all or nothing’ affair and the other as system of 
governance that ranges on continuous scale from ‘bad’ to 
‘good’. The work on the maintenance of democracy 
emphases the importance of the economic dimension, as 
well as the institutional and cultural dimension. Finally, 
the work on the consequences of democracy has led to a 
new impulse in the international donor community to see 
good governance, and in certain instances, democracy, 
as a key factor in bringing about sustained levels of 
equitable development. This work has required a set off 
measures of country performance across a set of criteria 
that variously include democracy, good governance, and 
human rights, while the use of the measures has varied 
from threshold conditions for aid allocation to the 
identification of significant entry points to encourage 
institutional reform and development. 
 
International assistance to develop democracy thus sits 
alongside scholarly attempts to define, measure, and 
compare democracy in ways that provide policy options 
for governments. Donor demand for simple rubrics for aid 
allocation based on a set of governance criteria has led to 
a sacrifice of validity, reliability, and context-specific 
information on democracy, good governance, and human 
rights that in turn has led to the persistence of 
arbitrariness in the allocation of international financial 
assistance. The reductionism inherent in any attempt to 
rank order countries will necessarily lead to an allocation 
of aid that will be perceived by developing countries as 
unfair or as unnecessarily punitive. Of the strategies 
outlined in this paper for developing democracy, the 
preferred strategy is one that uses of some form of 
measurement that draws on the best available data to 
provide a performance profile through which areas in 
need of assistance are identified. Rank orderings and 
allocation of aid are far too crude a set of instruments for 
providing the kind of long-term assistance needed to 
develop the practices, institutions, and culture that make 
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